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Editorial Note:

In the 1980s, civil war in Mozambique forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their
homes and seek refuge in neighbouring countries, including South Africa. Formal refugee status
was granted only after the civil war ended, with the signing in October 1992 of a Tripartite
Agreement between Mozambique, South Africa and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). The majority of these former Mozambican refugees clearly wish to remain
in South Africa, as few took advantage of a UNHCR offer of free repatriation to Mozambique in
the early 1990s. In 2000, an estimated 200-220 000 former Mozambican refugees remained on
South African soil. The South African Cabinet decided in December 1996 that Mozambican
refugees who wished to remain in the country should be given permanent residence status. This
amnesty was eventually implemented between August 1999 and February 2000 by the
Department of Home Affairs (DHA). Unlike earlier amnesties, a number of NGOs participated
in the outreach, advocacy and monitoring components of the amnesty’s implementation. This
paper presents a detailed examination of the amnesty process, including its planning, the criteria
for eligibility, the information campaign, the application procedures, the problems encountered
and the lessons learned. Recommendations from this document can be drawn upon to develop
appropriate responses to any future refugee influx to South Africa, whether from neighbouring
countries or further afield. This report was prepared by Nicola Johnston of the Wits Rural
Facility.
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1.0

Causes and Dimensions of the Mozambican Refugee Movement to South Africa

1.1

In the 1980s, the civil war in Mozambique forced hundreds of thousands of people from
their homes. By the end of the decade, the population of Mozambican refugees in the
neighbouring countries of Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and
Swaziland was estimated at 1.7 million; or more than 10% of the total population of
Mozambique.1 A further 4 million were internally displaced by the war. Many who
crossed into South Africa had already been displaced within Mozambique and were
forced to flee again with the spread of the fighting. Refugees came with horrific
accounts of the viciousness of the war.2

1.2

The majority of Mozambican refugees who fled to South Africa came in the mid-1980s.
This was the most violent period of fighting in the 16 year war. They arrived in their
thousands and often as whole village groups from rural border areas in Gaza and Maputo
provinces. The majority fled on foot across the closest border. For many this meant
walking through the Kruger National Park and risking attack by wild animals.3

1.3

Apartheid South Africa did not recognise the UNHCR, the UN and OAU Refugee
Conventions nor the refugee status of the Mozambicans. The refugees were allowed to
settle by the former homeland authorities of Gazankulu and Kangwane. This was
permitted by the Pretoria regime provided that the refugees did not leave these areas.
Ironically, therefore, they became more integrated into local communities in South Africa
than in other countries of refuge. The fact that they were for the most part Shangaanspeaking meant that integration into local communities was eased since social and
cultural links across the border were historically well-established.

1.4

At the height of the mass influx period, there were an estimated 350 000 Mozambican
refugees in South Africa. The traumatic war experience, prolonged fighting and
1
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profound social disruption in Mozambique prompted the majority of refugees in South
Africa to remain on after the war ended. This contrasted with the situation in Malawi,
Swaziland and Zimbabwe when the majority of refugees returned to Mozambique after
the war.

2.0

Profile of the Mozambican Refugee Population in South Africa

2.1

In 2000, an estimated 200-220 000 former Mozambican refugees remained on South
African soil, despite the fact that the civil war ended in 1992.4 They still live mainly in
north-eastern South Africa, along the border with Mozambique. The majority have been
there for 10-20 years. They have become reasonably well integrated into local
communities, although they represent a particularly vulnerable sector of an historicallydisadvantaged rural population due to their previous lack of formal status. They
generally live in settlements close to local villages, where they have built traditional
mud-brick houses on land allocated to them by local chiefs. Another group has settled in
the large peri-urban settlement area of Winterveld near Pretoria in North West Province.
Pockets of refugees also reside in parts of northern Kwazulu-Natal Province, though they
have remained much less visible.

2.2

The majority of these former Mozambican refugees clearly wish to remain in South
Africa. In the early 1990s, fewer than 35 000 availed themselves of a UNHCR offer of
free repatriation to Mozambique, and many of these subsequently returned to South
Africa. Many of the younger generation were born in South Africa and are schooling or
working here. The war experience of violence, community division and severed families
also left many too traumatized to return. In many cases, there is little left to go back to.
Many former refugees have married locally and are not distinguishable from other local
South Africans except for a slight accent in their pronunciation. The majority, however,
live in what are still referred to as “temporary” settlements, which resemble satellite
2
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villages attached to local villages or small townships. Here they have poor access to
land, water or electricity.

2.3

The Mozambicans provide a power base for many local chiefs or civic leaders, who
therefore wish to retain them as such. However, with greater pressure on land use in the
former homeland areas, some leaders have requested Mozambicans to consider returning
to Mozambique. The land which the Mozambicans occupy is generally common grazing
land which is in short supply.

2.4

The failure of the apartheid state to grant the Mozambicans formal refugee status when
they initially arrived in the 1980s rendered them highly vulnerable in terms of access to
protection, justice, basic facilities and resources. The most fundamental consequence of
the lack of status for refugees before 1993 was economic: “as a result of the
Government’s denial that there was a refugee situation, very little international assistance
was available. As such, even those settled in separate refugee settlements enjoyed only
limited nutritional assistance, not the broader material assistance generally associated
with such settlement patterns.”5 In the majority of cases Mozambican refugees were
therefore obliged to join the migrant labour force, working both on the commercial farms
and in the urban areas “where their lack of documentation rendered them vulnerable to
super-exploitation and abuse by employers.”6

2.5

After 1994, Mozambican refugees were subject to a more intense and new form of
harassment as the new government stepped up its efforts to control undocumented
migration. By the late 1990s, the post-apartheid government was deporting over 150 000
Mozambicans a year. The police made no distinction between new unauthorized
residents and long-standing refugee residents. Although the numbers are unknown, it is
clear that many refugees have been deported over the years (the majority of whom
undoubtedly return as soon as they can).7
3
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3.0

Voluntary Repatriation of Mozambican Refugees

3.1

Formal refugee status was granted only after the civil war had ended in 1992, with the
signing of a Tripartite Agreement between Mozambique, South Africa and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Mozambicans were granted
refugee status through a process of “group determination” if they had arrived in South
Africa between January 1985 and December 1992. Refugee status was also granted to
those who had arrived as contract workers during the early 1980s and who became
“refugees sur place” due to the prevailing security situation in Mozambique.8

3.2

The Agreement adopted the refugee definitions given in the 1951 UN Convention and the
1969 OAU Convention. The Mozambicans were the first group ever to be granted
“refugee” status in South Africa, even before the country had actually signed the UN
Convention on Refugees (which it did after the first democratic elections in 1994). They
are also the only “mass influx” refugees South Africa has experienced.9 The Agreement
itself was a breakthrough but was also potentially very restrictive:

The presence of a refugee shall thereafter be regularised provided that the
continued presence alone of such a person shall not establish any claim to
permanent residence or any similar right in South Africa (Article IV, Section II c)

Refugees shall enjoy full legal protection, but shall not have automatic
entitlement to social, economic and welfare rights, provided that they shall not be
treated any less favourably than aliens generally in the same circumstances
(Article IV, Section II d).

3.3

The Agreement did enable the UNHCR to organize a voluntary repatriation programme.
Voluntary repatriation started 17 months after the civil war ended in Mozambique and
4
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lasted from March 1994 to April 1995. The initial UNHCR estimate of the number of
people wishing to be repatriated was 250 000. This was later revised to 120 000 in
August 1994, due to the low response rate of potential returnees. By the end of the
organised repatriation programme, only 31 569 (12.6% of the initial estimate) had
returned to Mozambique from South Africa. This return rate was extremely low
considering the fact that South Africa hosted the largest number of Mozambican refugees
after Malawi.

3.4

By the end of 1995, a further 35 471 had repatriated of their own accord. This gave a
total of 67 060 returnees. Research by the University of the Witwatersrand Refugee
Research Programme (RRP) amongst refugees, deportees and returnees identified the
following reasons for the low response rate.

People were afraid to go back and start again with nothing, after having spent
such an extensive period of time in South Africa (an average of 10 years). Many
of those who took up the offer of voluntary repatriation later returned to South
Africa due to the lack of access to land and the danger posed by remaining landmines.

Though the civil war ended with the signing of a Peace Agreement in October
1992, many did not believe that the peace would last, since it had broken on so
many occasions in the past. In Mozambique, radio broadcast indicated that there
were still “warriors in the bush” preparing to go back to fighting if a peace
settlement was not reached between political parties. Refugees in South Africa
received these radio broadcasts and did not believe the war was really over.
Rumours even surfaced that the UN vehicles were taking people to military bases
to be killed.

5

Southern African Migration Project
The Point of No Return
______________________________________________________________________________
Late delivery of promised goods and materials such as food, ploughing tools and
seeds after people were repatriated to their villages in Mozambique was
communicated to those remaining in South Africa and acted as a deterrent to
further potential returnees. When returnees did not get goods they had been
promised, some came back to South Africa and spread the news that there was no
emergency assistance being provided in Mozambique.

Lack of infrastructure such as schools, clinics and roads in Mozambique was cited
as a reason for refugees choosing to remain in South Africa.

Political factors also affected a large number of potential returnees. The
voluntary repatriation programme coincided with elections and related campaigns
in both South Africa and Mozambique. In South Africa refugees were promised
citizenship and equal rights during election campaigns. They were also granted
the temporary right to vote in the 1994 South African general elections.

The fact that refugees were not given a chance to assess the situation in
Mozambique before deciding to return meant that potential returnees were unable
to dispel fears and rumours. Many only realised that the peace was lasting and
that conditions were adequate in Mozambique after the UN repatriation
programme had closed. Those who could afford to then returned of their own
accord, while others remained, unable to afford the transport costs for themselves
and their few possessions.

3.5

On 31 December 1996, one year after the end of the UNHCR voluntary repatriation
programme, a Cessation Clause was invoked, ending the short period of formal refugee
status of Mozambicans in South Africa. This left those remaining Mozambicans who had
come to South Africa as refugees once again without any formal status in the country.
6
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The cessation of refugee status also saw an end to the supply of organised food assistance
through Operation Hunger and the World Food Programme. As a result, these former
refugees were forced to find work by whatever means to support their families. Many
were forced to travel to urban areas and live and work informally. Some managed to
acquire South African permanent residence status, since they had a South African spouse,
or had been born in the country. The majority, however, remained without any formal
status.

3.6

The Cessation Clause was preceded by a South African Cabinet decision to grant
amnesty to those who had fled the civil war in Mozambique and wished to settle in South
Africa. In theory, this should have meant that Mozambican refugees were not left in
limbo, insecure and vulnerable. In practice, this is exactly what happened. The
Cessation Clause granted former Mozambican refugees “exceptional leave to remain”,
though what this meant was never stipulated. The extended delay in implementing the
amnesty decision meant that deportations of refugees continued. Their situation
remained extremely vulnerable with limited economic survival options or access to basic
services.

4.0

Amnesties and Exemptions

4.1

Since 1994, the new South African government has implemented several immigration
amnesties with implications for the status of former Mozambican refugees.10 The first
was the Miners Amnesty announced in October 1995. This granted the opportunity for
miners who had been working on contract in South Africa since 1986 to apply for
permanent residency. A number of Mozambican residents qualified for South African
residence under this amnesty.11 Because Mozambican miners have to be recruited in
Mozambique, the vast majority are residents of that country and not refugees. This

7
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amnesty therefore had limited impact on the Mozambican refugee population in South
Africa.

4.2

Of greater significance was the amnesty for Southern African Development Community
(SADC) nationals in July 1996. This amnesty offered the opportunity for SADC citizens
to apply for permanent residence, provided that they had been living in South Africa for
five years or more, had no criminal record, and either were involved in economic activity
or had a South African spouse or dependant born or residing lawfully in the country.
Since Mozambique is a SADC country and most refugees came to South Africa in the
1980s, many qualified for this amnesty. However, as in most refugee contexts, many had
insufficient documentation to support their applications. Some 146 672 Mozambicans
applied for the amnesty, a mixture of refugees and migrant workers.12 Around 60% of
these applications emanated from Mpumalanga and Northern Province.13 In total, 61 000
applications were rejected by the Department of Home Affairs, most on the grounds of
inadequate documentation.

4.3

The South African Cabinet decided in December 1996 that Mozambican refugees who
wished to remain in the country should be given permanent residence status. It took
nearly three years before this decision was implemented. The amnesty was finally
implemented between August 1999 and February 2000 by the Department of Home
Affairs (DHA). The process offered the estimated 220 000 former refugees still
remaining in the country the opportunity to apply for permanent residence status, or to
register for assistance to return to Mozambique.

4.4

It is important to understand the reasons for delay and how they were dealt with by the
various interested parties. The DHA claimed that the initial delay was due to changes in
legislation on 1 July 1997 regarding permanent residency status and citizenship, as well
as a backlog of applications from the 1996 SADC exemption.
8
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The DHA also claimed on more than one occasion that it lacked the resources to
implement the amnesty.14 Once 1999 rolled around without any action, the general
election further delayed the amnesty start date, as it was not a strong vote-winner to be
legalizing two hundred thousand Mozambicans at this time. On a practical level DHA
officials were fully occupied with the registration of Identity Documents for South
African citizens wishing to vote.

4.5

The urgent need for implementation of the amnesty was stressed at a SAMP Conference
in Pretoria in June 1997 and at a workshop in Nelspruit in July 1997 hosted by the
Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA) and the Mpumalanga
Legislature. A task force was set up following the workshop with representation from
AWEPA, Wits Rural Facility, Idasa (as the South African SAMP partner) and the
Department of Home Affairs (DHA). Several meetings were held which raised issues of
concern relating to the context and conditions under which the amnesty would be
implemented.15

4.6

Of particular concern to the NGO partners was the process of learning from the mistakes
made in the earlier SADC amnesty, particularly around an effective outreach strategy.16
Once an agreement had been drawn up with the DHA, the NGO and government
participants discussed the broad issues and terms of implementation. These included the
dissemination of information, experience of previous amnesties, governmental and nongovernmental cooperation, eligibility, viable proof and documentation, access and
outreach support. Further discussion of the details of this project was then decentralised
to the main focus provinces where the former refugee population were concentrated
(Mpumalanga, Northern Province, North West Province and Kwazulu-Natal). The
degree of non-governmental input and consultation was in marked contrast to the earlier
SADC amnesty.

9
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5.0

Planning the Amnesty Process

5.1

In the implementation of the 1996 SADC Amnesty, it was clear that there were
considerable access barriers for applicants in the former Mozambican refugee
communities. An evaluation of that Amnesty led to several recommendations for further
interventions:17

Provision of outreach centres in rural areas, to reduce applicants’ travel costs.

Establishment of application support and advice services for appeals, particularly
in rural areas.

Shortening of forms, so that only information directly relating to the application is
collected.

Provision of better trained temporary staff.

Consistency in accepting varied forms of documentation.

Devising means to ensure that all application procedures be carried out in one
visit (i.e. criminal record check, application, collection of supporting documents).

Allowing applications from women applying independently of their partner or
spouse.

Developing a common vision of the purpose of the Amnesty between the policy
makers and the implementing agents. This should be done by improving
communication both between different departments and between different levels
10
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of Home Affairs. The motives behind policy decisions should be clearly stated
and should inform the manner of implementation.

5.2

A key challenge for the refugee amnesty was to overcome the prohibitive transport costs
which had dissuaded potential SADC amnesty applicants from coming to DHA offices to
make an application. The first task was therefore to identify the areas where there was
the greatest concentration of Mozambican refugees in the four focus provinces and to
make recommendations for where mobile units should be placed to assist those far from
DHA offices. Nineteen mobile unit locations were identified to cover Northern Province
and Mpumalanga, one in the North West to cover Winterveld and one roaming unit in
Kwazulu-Natal to cover the pockets of refugee households living in a widespread area.
In Northern Province six regional DHA offices were involved in the project,
Mpumalanga had three offices involved, North West Province two offices and KwazuluNatal one.

5.3

To service the mobile units, the DHA required additional temporary staff for which it had
no budget allocation. Since this was crucial to the success of the intervention, AWEPA
undertook to raise funds for these officials from its donors, despite the fact that it was not
normal procedure to fund government structures. Once funds had been secured, a formal
contract had to be drawn up between the DHA and AWEPA. After that had been signed,
there were further technical delays while the Department of Finance processed the
AWEPA funding support.

5.4

The NGO partners involved in the outreach programme included the South African
Council of Churches (SACC), the National Para-Legal Association (NORTRAPA),
SAMP (through Idasa), the RRP and AWEPA’s implementing arm, Refugiado.18 A
training programme was put together to sensitise and orient partners to the situation of
former Mozambican refugees, the motivations behind the amnesty and the outreach
11
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support initiative. The programme also defined clear roles and responsibilities for each
of the partners in their work together as a team:

The SACC provided volunteers for each of the mobile units to assist the
applicants and the DHA with the filling-in and sorting of forms. The SACC have
a long history of contact and support of the former Mozambican refugee
communities. Their participation was encouraged in order to counter refugees’
fears regarding the real motivation of DHA, which many refugees had previously
experienced through arrest and deportation.

SAMP supported the initial political negotiations for the terms of the Amnesty
and produced the information materials through Idasa.

NORTRAPA provided one para-legal for each mobile unit to assist applicants
with any advocacy issues and advice. This had been a recommendation from the
SADC Amnesty evaluation in order to counter corruption and potential illtreatment of applicants.

RRP had two field monitors, one in each of the major focus provinces (Northern
Province and Mpumalanga); one data analyst monitoring the number of
applications from each mobile unit; and one monitoring coordinator developing
monitoring strategies, bringing all the monitoring information together in report
form, and following up issues of concern with the appropriate body.

Recommendations for selection procedures, roles and responsibilities, and
information dissemination techniques were included in the planning document
and commissioned by Refugiado from RRP.

12
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5.5

In terms of collaborating so closely with NGOs, this project was unprecedented for the
DHA. Once the process was decentralised to a provincial level to deal with details of
implementation and coordination, collaboration became more fluid. In general, this was
very positive in terms of mixing different areas of expertise and varied approaches to the
same process. Once a working relationship was established on the ground between the
different partners, trust and adaptability increased. Positive, interactive and open
working relations were established over time. Once a relationship of trust and respect
was established, it was important to sustain a realistic balance between the bureaucratic
and procedural approach of the DHA and the humanitarian participatory approach of
NGO partners relating to the needs of applicants.

5.6

The DHA was initially insecure about the envisaged “monitoring” role of the para-legals.
However, once job descriptions were circulated and roles and responsibilities established
these concerns were allayed. Having received the job descriptions of the para-legals, the
DHA Northern Province even took the initiative of providing a one-day training session
for the para-legals on immigration procedures and regulations which related to the
process. All partners were given the opportunity to raise issues of concern with the
process; these were summarised and documented in the monthly monitoring reports
produced by the RRP office. The issues raised in these reports formed the agenda of
coordination meetings.

6.0

Defining Eligibility

6.1

The only condition applied to this amnesty by the DHA was that the applicant should
have come to South Africa during the period of the civil war in Mozambique; effectively
before the Peace Declaration was signed in October 1992. In discussions at the national
committee level it was agreed to extend the deadline to the end of 1992. In this way,

13
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economic migrants from Mozambique would be separable from those who fled the
country because of the civil war.

6.2

The guidelines drafted by the DHA (Departmental Circular No.34 of 1999) were based
on provincial discussions between all the partners. However, some additional restrictions
and inclusions were added by the DHA. The provision of a start-date of 1985 (Sections:
1.2, 1.4a and 4) for the period of eligibility was one addition. Although the mid-1980s
saw the height of the influx of Mozambican refugees to South Africa, there were many
who came at the beginning of the 1980s. NGOs therefore argued that the amnesty should
include those who came at the beginning of the 1980s and previously. They were
concerned about the treatment of those who had originally come for work and remained
as “refugees sur place”, due to the situation in Mozambique.

6.3

A further concern raised by NGOs was that genuine applicants were already being
arrested and deported, which would undermine the amnesty initiative. To stop this
situation, a moratorium on the deportation of Mozambicans was requested by NGO
partners. The DHA refused to agree to such a moratorium, citing the large number of
undocumented Mozambican migrants in the country. It agreed simply that immigration
officials would be sensitised to the project. In addition, at a provincial level the DHA
agreed not to arrest bogus applicants at offices and mobile units during the application
phase, so as not to deter genuine applicants from applying.

6.4

Throughout the process, the DHA remained extremely wary of “bogus” applicants, either
Mozambicans who entered the country after the civil war or other migrants who were
non-Mozambican nationals. It wanted to limit the planned information campaign and
applications to the main refugee settlement provinces – Northern Province, Mpumalanga,
North West and Kwazulu-Natal – and to exclude Gauteng Province, where the majority
of “economic migrants” were located. NGOs argued that many Mozambican former
14
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refugees were resident in Gauteng, especially in areas like Alexandra and Soweto. Some
of these had their household base in the settlement provinces, but had been forced to seek
employment in Gauteng once food distribution ceased in 1994. Others came straight to
Gauteng during the war to seek employment and support themselves and their
households. Many had relatives or friends who had been working in Gauteng before the
war and had come to join them when fighting began in Mozambique. The DHA
remained unwilling to extend the project to Gauteng Province, effectively shutting out
many Mozambicans who had come to South Africa in the 1980s, in possible
contravention of the Cabinet decision.

6.5

Despite the fact that there was only one condition for the amnesty, establishing accepted
and realistic proof of date of entry was difficult. The majority of genuine former
refugees were without any formal documentation. Here the detailed knowledge of the
NGO partners working directly with the former Mozambican refugee communities was
to prove crucial. Community meetings were held to establish what official papers or
documents potential applicants possessed, and which might be used for dating their entry
into South Africa. The following documents were identified and accepted as supporting
proofs by the DHA:

•

Food ration cards (received by some refugees when they first arrived in RSA)

•

Identity cards from the Tribal Authorities

•

Gazankulu/Kangwane pass books (issued in 1987-89)

•

White identity cards issued by the Mozambican Consulate

•

Hospital/Health cards

•

“Road to Health” cards of children born in RSA

•

School/creche records

15
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Some documents – such as the Gazankulu/Kangwane passbook (issued in 1987-89),
ration cards issued by the SACC (1984-90), and Voluntary Repatriation Application
Forms (VRAF) – were only ever issued to former Mozambican refugees. These were
taken as accepted proof. However, the ration card only had a serial number and had to be
linked up to a directory to establish if the applicant in possession of the card was the real
owner. It was agreed that if this ration card was supported by an affidavit from the
issuing body this would constitute an accepted proof. Not all former Mozambican
refugees were issued with ration cards, since food distribution took place only between
1984 and 1994 and those arriving after 1990 were not issued with ration cards. Also,
some people had lost or disposed of their ration-cards, since they were redundant after
the food-distribution programme ceased in 1994.

6.6

There were clearly genuine applicants who were without any of the above-mentioned
documents. The NGOs therefore proposed that referral letters or affidavits should be
accepted from certain recognised bodies who were familiar with the former Mozambican
refugee community members. This included the Tribal Authorities, who in many cases
had allocated communal lands for the refugees to settle on, and the SACC, who had been
supporting the Mozambican refugee communities since their arrival. Civic Associations
were also included, though in practice these referral letters were not accepted as sole
proof, since the associations were established after the cut-off date for proof of entry
(1992). Hence these documents were taken more as supporting evidence. School, creche,
hospital and clinic referral letters could also be used in support of applications. For those
who were employed, an affidavit from an employer was also accepted. To cover those
who were without an employer to vouch for them, the NGOs proposed that affidavits
from friends, relatives and neighbours in possession of RSA identity documents be
accepted, though in practice this had to be substantiated by other proofs such as hospital
records.

16
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6.7

In the case of applicants not possessing any of the above documents, verification
interviews were to be used. It was agreed that these might also be applied in addition to
documents. They were to follow the Guidelines for Refugee Status Determination of
Mozambicans in South Africa in conjunction with Departmental Circular No.34 of 1999.
The latter effectively excluded those former Mozambican refugees who had settled in
areas other than those stipulated, i.e. Northern Province, Mpumalanga, North West and
northern parts of Kwazulu-Natal.

6.8

An additional condition included by DHA Head Office at a very late stage was the
requirement for applicants to prove their Mozambican nationality. This was supposedly
to avoid bogus applications from non-Mozambican nationals. The requirement posed a
new set of problems to the implementation partners. Although DHA immigration
officers felt capable of establishing the nationality of an applicant through interview
procedures, the DHA claimed that this would be extremely time-consuming and take
them from their other numerous duties. Some DHA provincial heads also felt that for
“political” reasons, the task of certifying nationality should be conducted by
representatives of the Mozambican State. The Mozambican Consulate in Nelspruit was
asked to participate in discussions to resolve the issue.

6.9

In practice, different provinces developed different approaches to the requirement for
proof of Mozambican identity. Mpumalanga initially did not take any applications at all
from those without proof of nationality. Northern Province took all applications and
those without proof of nationality were kept as pending files, awaiting a support initiative
from the Mozambican Consulate. In this way they acquired statistics of those files
pending proof of Mozambican nationality, which in turn assisted the Consulate to
develop an appropriate outreach support based on the known workload. So as not to
undermine access, it was necessary for the Consulate to run a simultaneous outreach
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initiative to support the amnesty process. There was again no budget to do this and
AWEPA again shouldered the responsibility of raising the funds required.

6.10

The process of acquiring the support of the Mozambican government, raising funds,
getting an agreement signed and recruiting people, took the whole six month application
period. This process was also slowed down significantly by the flood disaster in
Mozambique. In the interim the Mozambican Consulates in Nelspruit and Durban
assisted those applicants who managed to come to their offices. However, for the
majority of applicants the travel costs were too high. It was finally agreed in all
provinces that applications should be taken pending proof of citizenship.

7.0

The Information Campaign

7.1

The importance of a targeted information campaign well in advance of the start of the
intervention and throughout the process had been highlighted in the SADC amnesty
evaluation.19 The most effective modes of information dissemination were seen to be
local radio and community meetings. A high percentage of the former Mozambican
refugee population are illiterate which again reinforced the necessity for these methods.
Targeted information leaflets were put together and translated into Shangaan and Swati.
The information included in these leaflets was compiled jointly by the NGO outreach
partners and the provincial DHA. The draft was slightly adapted and then approved by
DHA Head Office. The media unit of Idasa was responsible for putting together leaflets
and compiling the radio programmes to go out on local radio stations. It was important
that this information was coming from non-governmental sources trusted by potential
applicants in order to allay fears amongst the former Mozambican refugee community
that this was a process to entrap them.
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7.2

The information campaign was originally scheduled to commence on 1 August 1998 and
the application process on 1 September 1998. However, the delays in the start of the
project affected the planned information campaign, which was to include the start date of
the project. When a start date for the project was finally secured at short notice for 9
August 1999 (a whole year later than originally planned), this allowed only a two-week
information campaign prior to the start of the project. However, since it had taken so
long to secure the start date the partners felt it was not appropriate to delay again in order
to enable a more extensive pre-start information campaign.

7.3

Local and provincial media were targeted during this initial campaign and on-going
information initiatives took place throughout the six month application phase and the
four month appeal phase. The aim of this exercise was to counter misinformation and
fear surrounding the process and inform applicants of various deadlines and procedures.
Local radio announcements had a visible effect during both the applications and appeals
phases. Community meetings set up by SACC and RRP provided an important “safe”
forum to give information, and for potential applicants to raise concerns and fears. In
addition to local and provincial coverage, wider national media was used to counter
potential xenophobic responses from the general public. Both local and national media
were very responsive to and supportive of the process.

8.0

Application Procedures

8.1

From the experience of the SADC Amnesty it was clear that some procedures needed to
be adapted and improved to avoid the huge backlog of applications and to ensure that all
genuine applicants were granted access to this project. The support of additional DHA
temporary officials, SACC volunteers and NORTRAPA para-legals ensured that there
were appropriate human resources to render the application process more efficient.
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8.2

In order to economise on stationery costs, the same application form as for the SADC
Amnesty (BI 169) was used. There was a surplus of these forms remaining in most DHA
offices. It was agreed that the sections of the form which did not apply to applicants for
this exemption would be omitted, as recommended in the SADC Amnesty evaluation. In
practice, this was the section relating to economic activity, since this was not a condition
for the refugee amnesty.

8.3

In some offices in Northern Province, Mozambican refugees who had applied for the
SADC exemption, but failed on grounds of lack of proof of economic activity, were
automatically taken as approved under this programme. They were fast-tracked to fill
forms to apply for their IDs (BI 9), which were then sent to Pretoria for processing.

8.4

One of the biggest delay factors for the SADC Amnesty had been the need to get police
clearance for all applicants before applications could be processed. This was done by the
Department of Justice in Pretoria, who checked the fingerprint sample of applicants on
their central database. A clean criminal record was also a condition for the refugee
amnesty. However, the NGOs motivated that those applicants who had been approved
on all other conditions (entry before 31 December 1992 and Mozambican nationality)
should be assisted to apply for an ID. It was initially agreed that this would be issued to
the applicant, but that it would be cancelled should it later prove that the applicant had a
criminal record. Some of these IDs were processed and returned to the local office
before feedback had been received from the Department of Justice. Offices were free to
use their own discretion on this. One office did not issue the ID until the criminal record
had been cleared, since it felt it would be difficult to retrieve an ID from applicants. This
then became the recommended practice from the regional office and caused delays of up
to three months for approved applicants to be issued with IDs after feedback from the
Department of Justice had been received.
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8.5

Though application procedures varied slightly from office to office, the emphasis at all
was on cutting down the number of follow-up visits required by the applicant. Some
offices allowed the applicant to fill out all forms including the application for an ID in a
single visit. Should the application be approved, the ID application could immediately be
sent off to Pretoria without the applicant having to return to the office to check the status
of his/her application and fill the subsequent forms on approval. Other offices were
concerned that the additional cost for the applicant of having to provide photos for the ID
application should be incurred only if the applicant was successful. In such cases, the
applicant would be required to visit the application point to check the progress of their
application. If approved they would then be asked to procure two photos and give their
fingerprints for an ID application. This method also meant that more first applicants
could be assisted since the additional ID forms did not need to be filled until later.

8.6

In an attempt to reduce the number of follow-up visits required by applicants, the Section
41s were issued for a three-month period rather than the usual 31 days. Applicants were
given staggered dates when they should return to check their applications. This was
effective when the processing of these applications followed expeditiously. However,
this was not always the case, since applications in some offices were processed on an ad
hoc basis. Others went according to reference number and order of application, which
meant that those who had come first would be first processed.

8.7

The DHA agreed that applications should be taken from a principal applicant and that
this application would cover their spouse(s) and dependants under the age of 18. In the
SADC Amnesty, some women had not been permitted to apply as principal or
independent applicants without their spouse. Although the official form stipulated no
gender for the principal applicant, in practice it was again interpreted as the husband.
This hindered applications from some women living apart from their spouse or
unsupported by their spouse. The issue was raised in the training sessions and the para21
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legals were asked to ensure that women be supported in submitting applications as a
principal applicant when requested.

9.0

Issues, Problems and Challenges Identified

9.1

Monitoring Responsibility. Responsibility for the monitoring and evaluation of the
implementation of the amnesty rested with the RRP. Monitoring reports were produced
on a monthly basis and distributed to all partners involved.20 The issues raised in these
reports formed the agenda for the regional and inter-provincial coordination meetings,
where they were discussed and resolved where possible. The main issues identified in the
monitoring are considered below.

9.2

Access to Documentation and Prohibitive Costs: The DHA accepted affidavits from
those who could certify that an applicant had been in the country from before the end of
the civil war. However, as with the SADC Amnesty, some local chiefs charged amounts
which were not affordable to many genuine applicants. The outreach programme
partners appealed to some chiefs to reduce their costs and received positive response in
some areas. In other cases, alternatives to the affidavit from the chief were found and
recommended.

9.3

Bogus Applicants: There were a number of bogus applicants who tried to take advantage
of the process. In the Giyani region in Northern Province, minibus taxis with
Mozambican registration numbers were seen at the offices bringing Mozambican
applicants directly from Mozambique. There were also reports from the informal border
post at Mbuzini, on the Mozambique-Swaziland border, that a number of those entering
on day concessions were not returning to Mozambique. The SANDF, which controls this
border, informed the DHA of these abnormalities. In response, copies were circulated of
the identification documents taken from those who crossed the border and did not return.
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If these people then applied for exemption, they were immediately disqualified. In an
attempt to avoid bogus applicants accessing the process, mobile units targeted former
refugee settlement areas and appealed to chiefs not to write documents for those they did
not know. However, the income for chiefs was an incentive not to comply. Those in
possession of fraudulent documents had their applications rejected.

9.4

General Operations: The provincial DHA offices were given extensive flexibility from
head office in Pretoria to take in applications for this project. The standard of assistance
provided to applicants improved over time as the mobile unit teams became more
organised and familiar with their tasks. The volunteers spent most of their time
providing information, completing application forms, sorting and checking application
files and feeding back results. The para-legals were most involved in advising applicants
on what supporting documents were required, giving information about the regularization
process and following up local cases of extortion. Applicants were generally treated well
by all the outreach partners though there were a few reported cases of aggressive
language by DHA officials in one particular office. However, this office was under a
significant amount of strain with a large influx of applicants.

During the festive seasons there were a number of applicants who had their application
documents confiscated from them as they crossed to Mozambique to visit relatives or
friends. This undermined the application process, but also emphasised the manner in
which the target group relates to borders. It had not been sufficiently explained to
applicants when they submitted their application that they were not permitted to cross
any border until their application had been processed and they were in possession of
correct travel documents. For many this would mean they would have to wait five years
to apply for South African citizenship with all the costs involved and then apply for a
South African passport. For others in possession of a Mozambican passport, they would
need to apply for permission from DHA to travel on a foreign passport after they had
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received their South African Identity Document. Such restrictive policies effectively
encourage unauthorized traversing of borders.

9.5

Protection of Applicants: The documentation issued to applicants to give them temporary
protection during the processing of their applications varied greatly. It was an ongoing
concern that, due to pressures with the huge influx of applicants, shortcuts were taken on
the issuing of the correct documentation to protect applicants. The agreed procedure was
that all applicants should be issued with Section 41s. Initially, the period for which these
Section 41s were valid varied from three weeks to three months. To avoid additional
administrative work renewing Section 41s, it was agreed at an inter-provincial level that
Section 41s would be issued for a three-month period. In practice, some applicants were
not issued with Section 41s at all. Some offices only issued applicants with their receipt
of application. Others included a stamped photo of the applicant on the receipt of
application. On some section 41s it was incorrectly stipulated that the applicant’s
movements should be restricted to the Province where the application was made. In one
office only applicants working in Gauteng were issued with Section 41s, because it was
not thought to be necessary for those living locally.

During the monitoring process there were ten reported cases of applicants getting
arrested by the police or SANDF at roadblocks close to borders, because they were not in
possession of any documentation. On one occasion genuine documents were reportedly
destroyed by the arresting police officer. In the other cases, applicants were not in
possession of a Section 41, or the police required verifications of their documents with
the issuing DHA office. DHA officers were supportive in getting applicants released
from arrest. An appeal was made to DHA to rectify this situation and the issue was
resolved in most offices over time. Shortage of both human resources and stationery
allocations were a factor throughout the process which contributed to correct procedures
not being followed.
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Other cases were reported of applicants being deported to Mozambique because their
Section 41 document had not been renewed after the expiry date. In some provinces, the
Section 41s were only given for 31 days, despite the agreement to extend them to a threemonth period to reduce administration for DHA and revisiting costs to the applicants. It
was not sufficiently emphasised to applicants that they would need to renew their Section
41s on the specified expiry date. Applicants interviewed stated that the costs involved to
travel to the DHA offices to renew their permits were prohibitive. Others were not aware
that they were required to do this and simply planned to go and check their application
after six months.

The sheer workload, shortage of immigration officers and stationery constraints led to
corners often being cut in the issuing of documents. The monitoring team was constantly
raising concerns relating to the lack of protection documentation. The para-legals were
requested to ensure that applicants were issued with Section 41s and that applicants kept
these up to date.

9.6

The Slow Processing of Applications: The influx of applicants in the Northern Province
was far greater than in Mpumalanga, North West and Kwazulu-Natal. This put a lot
more pressure on the offices in this Province. The SACC volunteers were tasked with
assisting in the processing of applications. This improved the speed of the process
although a backlog of unprocessed applications remained a year later. These were
mainly applications still pending proof of no criminal record by the Department of
Justice in Pretoria. Refugiado continued to fund one temporary DHA officer and one
volunteer to assist with processing in each DHA district office for a period of three
months after the close of the application phase. However, this was insufficient time in
which to complete all the processing and the DHA permanent staff was left with this as
an additional task on top of its everyday work. As a result, processing of remaining
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applications became exceedingly slow and applicants and DHA officials alike were
frustrated by the situation.

9.7

Appeals Procedures: After the closure of the applications phase, an appeals process was
set up to support any rejected applicants who wished to exercise their right to appeal the
decision. In Northern Province and Mpumalanga, there was a para-legal based at each of
the DHA offices which had been involved in the project. The para-legals advised those
who wanted to appeal and submitted written appeals to the DHA regional board for
consideration. On the request of the para-legals, draft appeal letters for common case
types were drawn up by the Wits Law Clinic. Applications were processed on different
premises in different offices. Some of the grounds for rejection were appealed at an
office level. Others were discussed at an inter-provincial level to attempt to standardise
procedures. As mentioned above, some offices allowed administrative mistakes to be
corrected without the application needing to go to the regional appeal board. Others
required that formal appeal procedures be followed. There were a number of appeal
cases which were rejected at a provincial level. Some of these were further appealed at a
national level.

The main grounds for rejection were the following:

•

incorrect date of entry;

•

return to Mozambique after initial entry to South Africa;

•

residential base in Gauteng;

•

those who worked as contract workers for their whole period in exile;

•

petty crime offence record;

•

fraudulent documents;
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•

young applicants without sufficient supporting documentation for an independent
application;

•

9.8

no proof of Mozambican nationality.

Return to Mozambique: Particularly in the refugee settlement areas close to formal
borders, there were many cases of applicants having returned to Mozambique and come
back to South Africa subsequent to their original entry into the country. These cases
included those who returned to locate family members and check the situation in the
country; those who were involuntarily deported to Mozambique; those who had returned
to attend funerals or support family crises; and those who had returned with the UNHCR
voluntary repatriation programme, but were unable to support themselves in the country
and therefore returned to South Africa. Such cases were appealed at a regional,
provincial and national level on the basis that all former refugees had the right to return
to establish whether conditions were safe or not,21 and that the Amnesty was qualified as
“unconditional” for those who had settled in South Africa. The NGOs argued that prior
to the elections in Mozambique in 1994, it was dangerous for anyone visiting the country
not to be in possession of a Mozambican identity card. Therefore, those going back to
check conditions in Mozambique would have had to acquire an identity card during this
period, otherwise they would have risked arrest. At the time of writing there was no
reversal on the decision.

9.9

Date of Entry: Applications often lacked sufficient proof of date of entry or included
contradictory information relating to the date. Such cases were most common for those
who used their Mozambican identity document to prove their Mozambican nationality.
When processing applications, the DHA checked the date when these documents were
issued and if this was later than the cut-off date, or different from the specified date of
entry, the application was rejected on the basis of inconsistency of supporting
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information. Such cases occurred mainly in the Nkomazi region (Mpumalanga), which is
close to the Komatipoort formal border post with Mozambique.

9.10

Applicants from Gauteng Province: As mentioned above, there were a large number of
potentially eligible applicants residing in Gauteng. Some of these had a residential base
in the focus provinces, but were working in Gauteng Province. Others had been based in
Gauteng since they had arrived in South Africa.

Applicants were not informed when they applied that applications from Gauteng would
not be accepted. This in itself was misleading. The DHA in this respect was “screening”
undocumented migrants by entering them on the Migration Control System, rather than
assisting those who were genuine applicants. Those who applied had to show proof of
residence in one of the focus provinces.

There were still bogus applicants who had arrived in South Africa after the cut-off date
and managed to acquire referral letters from chiefs or bogus employers stating that they
had come to South Africa before 1992. This jeopardised the applications of those who
were genuine applicants from Gauteng since it heightened the suspicion of the DHA.
The fact that North West Province was a focus province yet is so close to Gauteng
province caused problems for those genuine applicants from areas such as Winterveld.
Many bogus applicants tried to apply through these offices (Brits and Garankua) which
made screening procedures much more stringent on the one hand and open to corruption
on the other. Rejected applications from Gauteng were approved on review only if the
applicants could prove that they had a residential base in one of the focus provinces.

9.11

Contract Workers: There were applicants who had been working as contract workers
since they first sought refuge in South Africa. The majority were working on
commercial farms in Mpumalanga, Northern Province and North West. They were
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required to renew their contracts on a yearly basis and for this some had, by law, to reenter Mozambique to renew the contract with an agent. Some such applicants were
rejected, despite the fact that their household base had been in South Africa since they
had arrived during the civil war.

9.12

Petty Crime Records: The applications of those rejected for having petty criminal records
were appealed and the majority were approved on review. Most of these petty criminal
records related to the lack of formal status of the applicant. These included records of
arrest and deportation, selling liquor without a licence and working without a permit.

9.13

Survival Fraud: A number of applicants were in possession of fraudulent South African
identity documents which had been acquired to access more stable work options and to
avoid arrest. These documents were often in an adopted South African name, so as not to
be conspicuous to the authorities. Some had been acquired through fraudulent means and
others applied for through DHA channels giving fraudulent supporting evidence. These
applicants approached the para-legals, SACC volunteers and RRP monitors for advice.
Many were keen to secure a legal ID in their own name and regularise their situation in
the country. A new ID application under a different name would be picked up in the
finger-screening process. In addition, young people who had completed their matric
exams under a false name would also have problems in changing the names on their
exam certificates.

This issue was taken up at an early stage in the planning process to a provincial appeal
level. A meeting was set up with then Premier for Mpumalanga, Mathews Phosa. Phosa
was sympathetic to the situation and added that many former exiles from South Africa
had experienced the same situation and adopted fraudulent documents to survive. He
agreed to raise the issue at a political level with the Minister of Home Affairs on the basis
of a motivation letter from the outreach partners. However, before the issue could be
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followed up, Phosa left office. The issue then had to be pursued in the appeals phase of
the project.

9.14

Incorrect Spelling of Names and Recalling Dates: As with the SADC Exemption, the
different spelling, and sometimes even different meaning, of the names of applicants was
a problem. Some applicants had adopted a South African name since residing in the
country, in order to be less conspicuous. The majority of applicants were illiterate, so
they were unable to spell their names for those taking their details for the application.
Dates were also often difficult to establish correctly from applicants. The majority of
applicants were illiterate, or only literate in Portuguese. In addition, there were
administrative mistakes with dates being miswritten by those who were taking down
information. Some applications were rejected for inconsistency in the spelling of names
or non-correlating dates. Para-legals conducted follow-up appeals for those who were
able to provide additional documentation. However, specialised interviewing skills
required to establish dates by alternative techniques were not available or were not
culturally applicable for Mozambicans.

9.15

Young Independent Applicants: There were a number of young applicants who were over
the age of 18 and therefore had to apply as a principal applicant independent of their
parents or guardians. This created problems when they had to prove their Mozambican
nationality, since they were either very young when they left Mozambique or were
actually born in South Africa. In both cases they had difficulties answering questions
posed by the Mozambican Consulate to establish Mozambican identity. Some cases were
resolved by applicants being requested to return with their parents, but this was difficult
for those whose parents were deceased or those who had been adopted by a local family.

9.16

No Proof of Mozambican Nationality: The largest caseload, which was still outstanding
at the time of writing, involved 25 462 applications in Northern Province. They were
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not given a concession to submit proof of Mozambican nationality after the stipulated
cut-off date for processing of applications. This was despite the fact that further funding
support was secured to enable the Mozambican Consulate to continue their outreach to
assist such applicants in Northern Province. These applications, many of which had been
submitted early in the application process, were no longer processed and applicants were
not granted the right to appeal. The case was appealed by the outreach NGOs initially at a
regional level and was then referred to the DHA head office.

9.17

Political Appeal: Some rejected applications of concern have been reviewed on request
of the NGO partners by DHA at a provincial level, but mostly with little success. Appeal
issues were raised with DHA head office in Pretoria with little positive response except
an agreed extension for pre-identified applicants who were not assisted on account of the
circumstances created by the torrential rains in February 2000. At the time of writing,
key appeal cases were being compiled for those which NGO partners felt should have
been included in view of the unconditional nature of the original Cabinet decision. Since
the amnesty was the result of a Cabinet decision, it was agreed by the NGO partners that
certain difficult issues at a bureaucratic level of appeal should be raised at a political
level (see Appendix 1).

10.0

Analysis of the Amnesty Process

10.1

Data Collection: Each application was given a reference number so that it would be
possible to trace applications. DHA entered all applications manually into registration log
books, held at each of the involved offices, and into the computerised Movement Control
System. The RRP also collected data evaluation forms from all the application points,
which were used as a monitoring tool in terms of directing the human resources to where
there was the greatest need. The number of applicants registered each day was recorded
by the SACC volunteers who assisted with filling and interpreting the forms. These
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records were collected and checked by the RRP monitors and then entered into a
database. The statistics gathered were a useful evaluation tool and enabled some
crosschecking of official DHA statistics.

Through the RRP data-collection process, it was possible to pick up duplicate reference
numbers and refer them back to the relevant DHA office. There were even examples of
up to five principal applicants from the same office with the same reference number.
This was usually corrected by allocating a letter to each.

The RRP statistics were more geographically specific because they included mobile unit
names. This gave a clearer picture of where the main concentration of former
Mozambican refugees were located in the two provinces covered (Northern Province and
Mpumalanga). A register was taken of the mobile unit where an application was made,
the area of residence, the reference number, the number of dependants and the date on
which the application was taken. At the appeals phase it was possible to monitor those
who were approved and rejected, as well as those who were approved on review.

DHA kept their own statistics of principal applicants, spouses, dependants, approved and
rejected applications, and those still outstanding. In Northern Province a specific record
was kept of those who were pending proof of Mozambican nationality.

10.2

Applications Process: The pattern of application for most amnesties is that the major
application influx takes place just prior to the closing date. In this project, the long-term
situation of vulnerability of the target group played a significant role in the delayed
response of genuine applicants to come forward and apply for exemption. For many,
mistrust of the motivation behind the amnesty initiative remained, despite the attempt to
circumvent this with the involvement of the SACC. Until peers were seen collecting
their IDs from the DHA offices, many did not believe that the initiative was genuine. Past
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experience of the DHA for most former refugees had been the arrest and deportation of
household members. Those who did come forward and were rejected for the SADC
Amnesty were also despondent, since they had invested time and money to apply without
any positive result. For this reason, they were not motivated to apply for this new
amnesty. Others claimed that without bribes they got nowhere and since they were either
unwilling or unable to pay the required bribes they did not believe it was worth trying.

For those working on commercial farms, the fact that the project took place during the
busy harvesting season affected their ability to apply. The response from farmers to this
initiative was also varied. Some were very keen to assist their workers to get formal
documents; others were dubious of the implications for them coming forward with their
former refugee labourers. Still others did not want their workers to have formal status
since they believed they would become more demanding in terms of the nature of their
contract and access to land. There were also those who just wanted to focus on getting
the short-term work done and were unwilling to provide their workers with time off to
apply for exemption.

The mobile units did go to the farms and assist former refugees to apply in some farming
areas. However, this could happen only with those farmers who were willing to cooperate with the process. The outreach project attempted to approach farmers unions to
emphasise the importance and time limit of the project. In general, this generated a
positive response, though some farmers required the reassurance of a DHA official that
they would not be penalised retrospectively for employing these people.

10.3

Number of Applicants: The estimated number of former Mozambican refugees residing
in South Africa was 200 000 – 220 000. The draft Guidelines from the DHA (Circular
No. 34 of 1999) gave a figure of only 90 000. The number of applicants during the
application phase (9 August 1999 - 31 July 2000) according to province was as follows:
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Table 1
Province

Applicants
received

Applicants
approved

Applicants
rejected

Applicants
outstanding

Northern

96997

69748

1787

25462

Mpumalanga

14036

9571

3742

723

2052

1482

558

12

17663

1168

10685

5810

130748

82969

16772

32007

Kwazulu-Natal
North West
Total
Source: DHA statistics 24/05/00

These figures suggest that the number of potential applicants exceeded the DHA
estimate.22 However, the RRP database has records of only 87 268 applicants from
Mpumalanga and Northern Province, 23 765 less than the DHA total of 111 033. This
can be partially explained by some inaccuracies picked up in the DHA statistical records,
in which some double counting was identified in the Northern Province. On the other
hand, the RRP data-collection was not fully functioning in the first few weeks of the
applications process. Some applications were missed at this stage, though the monitors
did update the records where possible, using the DHA office registers. With the huge
number of applications, there was also much room for human error. The fact that there
were so many offices involved in the project in Northern Province made it difficult to
track down mistakes.

10.4

Success Rates and Appeals: Northern Province had by far the highest number of
applications to deal with. The general success rate for applicants in Northern Province
was also much higher than other Provinces. This reflects the fact that the highest number
of genuine applicants are also based in this Province. The 25 452 outstanding applicants
are those discussed above in Section 9.16 who were not considered because they did not
provide proof of Mozambican nationality before the cut-off date.
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In Mpumalanga there was a relatively high number of rejections. This can be explained
by several factors. The geographical location of the offices and mobile unit was very
close to the formal border with Mozambique and Swaziland and there was a noted influx
of Mozambicans throughout the applications period, many of whom did not qualify as
genuine applicants. Rejected applications included some with petty administrative
mistakes. In Northern Province these were corrected before the final processing, to avoid
the added administrative procedure of going to appeal. Hence the number of appeals in
Mpumalanga far outweighed those in Northern Province. Mpumalanga’s rejection rate
was 28.7%, Kwazulu-Natal was 31.5% and Northern Province was only 2.8%, despite the
fact that there were many more applications in Northern Province.

In Kwazulu-Natal, any applicants residing outside the stipulated northern area were
rejected irrespective of what proof they provided of their reasons for entering the country
originally. Hence the number of rejections from this office was also relatively high. The
northern Natal area is close to an international border, so some applicants might have
crossed the border to apply for the amnesty. A major ground for rejection was the “date
of entry” for applicants in this area. There were also reports from the Durban Refugee
Forum that a number of former Mozambican refugees resident in the area had not had a
chance to apply due to the restricted interpretation of the geographical delimitation of
areas of refugee settlement.

In the North West Province, or more specifically the Winterveld area, the interpretation
of the DHA in processing applications was that applicants needed to prove they were
“refugees”. Even if they had entered the country prior to the end of the civil war, many
who did not have a supporting affidavit stipulating that they came to the country as
refugees were disqualified. Application screening was also very strict in some offices to
ensure that applicants from neighbouring Gauteng Province were excluded from
exemption, irrespective of what proof they presented.
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10.5

Return Applicants: From all focus provinces, only 158 applicants registered for
assistance to return to Mozambique. This low figure totally contradicted a pre-amnesty
survey conducted by RRP to gain an insight into the potential number of former
Mozambican refugees still wishing to return to Mozambique.23 Though this survey was
not statistically representative, all the former refugee community members interviewed
stated that there were people who still wanted to return to Mozambique and would
register for assistance if it was available. Of the over 200 interviews conducted it was
projected that a minimum of 20% and a maximum of 40% of former Mozambican
refugees in Northern Province and Mpumalanga would register for assistance to return to
Mozambique. From follow-up interviews during the project, it appears that the chance of
acquiring a South African identity document quickly became the favoured option. There
were also some who stated that they would first want to try to get a South African ID,
then take their family back to Mozambique and later come back to South Africa to work.

10.6

Communication and Coordination: Government and NGO coordination was based on a
“learning-by-doing” model, which meant correcting mistakes as implementation
proceeded. There was often insufficient follow-up because so many different areas (both
geographical and organisational) were being covered. Communication between the DHA
and NGO partners at an intervention level and on a day-to-day basis was good.
However, there were still problems with information being disseminated from the interprovincial meetings to those conducting the interventions. In some offices and units the
minutes of these meetings and feedback had not been circulated. At another level,
communications between DHA head office and DHA provincial/regional level was also
ineffective. NGO partners kept in frequent telephone contact throughout the application
and appeal phases of this project. NGO coordination meetings were held between the
various organisation coordinators on a month to six-weekly basis. There were occasional
problems with information from these meetings not reaching representatives in the field.
This was particularly an issue with NORTRAPA, who did not have a budget for their
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coordinators to visit the para-legals. It was eventually decided that the NORTRAPA
coordinators should rather be represented at meetings by one selected para-legal from the
field, who was more familiar with what was happening on the ground.

Most partners had other work obligations in addition to this project. This at times
hindered the effectiveness of the project work. There were also meetings between DHA
Pretoria, AWEPA and Refugiado at which NGO partners had not been given a chance to
give inputs. This created frustration amongst NGO partners who felt that their expertise
and experience was not being made use of.

10.7

Level of Outreach: The level of outreach activities varied from office to office and was
often directed by the influx of applicants to the office as well as the geographical spread
of former refugee settlements in the vicinity of the office. At offices like Giyani and
Malamulele in the Northern Province, there are large refugee settlements in close vicinity
to the offices. The offices are also easily accessible from Gauteng. Hence the outreach
activities were curbed due to the mass influx of applicants to the offices.

In order to encourage applicants to come forward, the DHA agreed to assist all applicants
and not effect any arrests of suspected bogus applicants at DHA offices until the
applications phase was over. However, in the Giyani, Malamulele and Mhala offices this
had a negative side-effect for genuine applicants in more distant refugee settlements, who
were unable to sustain travel costs to come and apply at the offices. This effectively
undermined the outreach programme. In response, NGO partners requested that the
outreach continue on set days of the week despite the high number of applicants at the
offices, who would then be assisted at a slower pace. This was a compromise agreement
which was not wholly satisfactory, but did facilitate access to more genuine applicants in
refugee settlement areas and made it more difficult for bogus applicants to access the
process.
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10.8

Accepted Documentation: Although accepted proofs had been identified and agreed upon
by all partners, in practice the weight of these proofs was given varying importance in the
different offices involved in this project:

•

Affidavit from a friend, relative or neighbour: At an early stage the Giyani regional
office stated that due to the potential for extortion and abuse, an affidavit from
friends, relatives or neighbours would not be accepted alone as sufficient
documentation of proof of entry. It would nonetheless be taken as secondary
supporting documentation, but other proofs would have to accompany it. This was
based on the disclosure that some local citizens were taking money from potential
applicants to write them a supporting affidavit. Such entrepreneurial activities were a
feature in most areas. However, the responses from the DHA offices were different.
The Daantjie mobile unit in Mpumalanga and the Mhala office in Northern Province
responded to the issue of extortion by interviewing those who proclaimed to know the
applicant. This involved a significant amount of additional work, but illustrated their
commitment to assist genuine applicants who were without formal documentation to
support their application.

•

Gazankulu/Kangwane Pass-book: The Gazankulu or Kangwane pass book was taken
as one of the best proofs to support both “date of entry” and proof of Mozambican
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nationality. These books were only issued between 1987 and 1989 to those who
came to South Africa as “refugees”. The books had an official stamp and the picture
of the holder. Some offices still required that applicants obtain an official proof of
Mozambican nationality, whereas others accepted this document as proof of
nationality. Unfortunately, those who came after 1989 were not issued with this
document.

•

Proof of Mozambican Nationality: The requirement for proof of Mozambican
nationality was included very late in the planning process and there were different
responses from the provinces to this requirement. Mpumalanga Province was
insistent that for the sake of international relations this proof should be a document
issued by the Mozambican government, such as a passport, identity document or a
certificate from the Mozambican Consulate. The Northern Province DHA was more
flexible in terms of being open to the immigration officers’ professional ability to
interview applicants to establish their nationality. This again involved greater time
commitment per applicant on the part of the DHA. In view of the fact that the
Northern Province had by far the highest workload, the preferred solution was for a
parallel outreach project by the Mozambican Consulate to support those without any
proof of Mozambican nationality.
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•

Referral Letter from the Traditional Authorities: This was the most widely-accepted
document and in practice often taken as a prerequisite for the approval of an
application. The Traditional Authorities had records of those to whom they had
allocated land when they first arrived in the country. However, the income
generation aspect of the referral letters was the driving motivation for most tribal
authorities to become involved. The NGO partners negotiated with the Traditional
Authorities to reduce their costs as much as possible so as not to exclude potential
genuine applicants who were unable to support such costs. Some were more
sympathetic than others. Charges ranged from R2 - R100. For specific cases during
the application extension period, no charge was made.24

Alternative options to the Traditional Authority letter were found and motivated for
in areas where these authorities were not willing to reduce their fee. In the
Phalaborwa area, for example, the SACC referral letter and the affidavit from the
food ration card issuing authority were widely used.

•

Secondary Proofs: In all offices, marriage documents, hospital, creche and school
records were taken as secondary proofs and applicants were requested to get a referral
letter or affidavit from the other accepted sources. Referral letters from Transitional
Local Authorities were not taken as primary proofs, because these bodies had been
set up after the 1992 cut-off date, despite the fact that members of this authority may
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have known the applicant for a longer period. During the appeals phase some
applicants were requested to acquire these secondary proofs to substantiate that they
had been in the country before the cut-off date.

10.9

Para-legal Support: Protection and legal advice was provided by the para-legals based at
each application point (office or mobile unit). Their role was to establish that applicants
were given sufficient advice and support to submit their applications. During the
applications phase para-legals spent most of their time checking that the documents of
applicants were in order before they submitted their applications. Some were requested to
follow up cases of applicants being apprehended and incorrectly arrested while
applications were being processed.

The independent role of para-legals was jeopardised in some DHA offices by the actions
of some DHA officials. This was compounded by the lack of guidance and support from
the provincial para-legal coordinators. During its monitoring activities, RRP was often
called upon to raise issues of grievance or need for guidelines on behalf of para-legals, in
effect playing a facilitatory role to procure the support needed. Some para-legals were
more experienced and confident than others and were able to support others when they
were given the opportunity to work together.
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10.10 Reasons for not Applying and Follow-up: The RRP office received several reports of
potential genuine applicants who were not included in this process. The explanations
provided for this were many. Some farm workers claimed they were not given a chance
to apply by their employer. Others claimed they were not informed until after the
application period was over. Some feared that the process was a means of identifying
and deporting them back to Mozambique. Others did not believe the project was genuine
until they saw their counterparts receiving their new identity documents, by which time
the application period was already closed.

These issues are being followed up by the NGO partners. Additionally, a programme for
formal integration support is being developed based on a needs assessment conducted by
RRP and the SACC in the communities currently hosting the former Mozambican
refugees. The results of this needs assessment are being used to address the integration
needs in each of the communities, to ensure the formal integration and support the
entrenchment of the rights of the former refugees in the communities where they have
settled. The focal issues have been around access to land for permanent settlement;
rights awareness; and the needs of vulnerable groups, such as old people and young
children. The aim is to develop initiatives to support the community as a whole, so as not
to create any tension in the community.
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10.11 Evaluation of the Success of the Legalization Process in Achieving its Stated Goals: The
basic stated goal of the Regularisation project was to formalise the status of former
Mozambican refugees still settled in South Africa. The fact that the project was finally
implemented after such prolonged delays was an achievement in itself. Without the
combined efforts of the NGO supporting partners it is unlikely that it would have been
brought to fruition at all, since there was no other push for implementation. The levels of
cooperation between the DHA and NGO partners was also exemplary in terms of
achieving a jointly coordinated project. Though many genuine applicants remain without
formal status in the country and extensive follow-up is still required, the number of
people assisted with the limited resources available is impressive.

11. 0

Lessons from the Amnesty

The main lessons learned from the evaluation of the Mozambican refugee amnesty
process include the following points:

1. The need for a clearly communicated motivation for Amnesty from government.
This was an issue for the SADC Amnesty well as this initiative. The different
interpretations of the process by the various DHA offices involved reflect the lack of
clarity on the aims of the amnesty and the essentially political motivation behind the
initial Cabinet decision.
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2. Commitment of required resources and support for the implementation of the
Amnesty. The necessary resource allocation to ensure that the process could be
implemented adequately was not budgeted for within government resources.
Implementation was subsidised by concerned NGO partners who had the welfare of the
target group at heart.

3. Development of constructive dialogue and close cooperation between government
and NGOs. The process illustrated that there is much scope for joint work between
government and NGOs. In the case of vulnerable groups such as undocumented
migrants and refugees, NGOs are generally more approachable than government bodies
and often have positive relationships with such groups which can be built on.

4. Fluent communication channels between all levels of government and various
actors involved in planning and implementation. Clear communication channels are
crucial with such national and multi-dimensional projects. These need to operate on a
two-way basis between the implementation base(s) and national headquarters. The
experience and knowledge of practitioners should also weigh more heavily in the
development and implementation strategies of such projects.

5. Clear and transparent roles and responsibilities of all actors involved. The
development of these is the basis for good planning and communication. In order to
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avoid overlap and tension and to ensure that such a project runs as smoothly as possible,
there need to be clear-cut roles and responsibilities as well as accepted terms of
reference. Exclusion of NGOs from some meetings and attempts to stop the free flow of
monitoring information were not consistent with this goal.

6. Commitment of all actors to the same objectives. The development and
understanding of common objectives is vital when there is a diversity of parties involved
from different angles and with different responsibilities.

7. Delegation to those with most relevant expertise and experience in the context of
the project. Those with greatest knowledge of the target population; those who have
experience with the context/environment in which the Amnesty will take place; and those
who are most familiar with the practical implementation of Amnesties and dealing with
applications need to be central in the planning phase of the project.

8. Formulation of appropriate terms of eligibility for the target population. This
process has been described in detail above and should be based on using local knowledge
and developing a participatory process at the project planning phase.
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9. Identification of appropriate proofs of eligibility for the target population and
bureaucracy. This needs to involve in-depth consultation with the target population and
NGOs, integrating both the humanitarian and bureaucratic perspectives of the project.

10. A comprehensive information campaign. From past experience with both the
SADC Amnesty and this project, it is clear that the information campaign needs to
happen well in advance of the implementation of the amnesty, as well as during and after
the process. Such a campaign needs to be clear, targeted and repetitive. It should aim to
inform the target population in their own languages, and should include a wider
information component to counter any potential xenophobic responses from the wider
population. During implementation it should aim to counter misconceptions as well as to
inform, and should allow space for any concerns of the target population and other
stakeholders to be raised.

11. Independent monitoring throughout the planning, implementation and followup. Monitoring should function as a feed-back tool for adaptation of activities during
implementation; raise any concerns of the various stakeholders; and deal with any issues
of barriers to access to the Amnesty as well as wider issues of protection. Although selfmonitoring and setting targets is a constructive component for the progress of such a
project, independent monitoring is also crucial with regard to objectivity, especially in
the context of covering humanitarian as well as practical issues.
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12. Awareness of potential areas of fraud or extortion in procuring documentation
to support applications. This should be an integral consideration of the planning of
such a project and the ongoing monitoring and evaluation during implementation.

13. Development of strategies to avoid bogus applicants without affecting the access
of genuine applicants. It is crucial that the genuine target group are not penalised by
responses and strategies to counter fraud and extortion. This is a difficult and sensitive
balance that needs to be continuously monitored, both by those coming into contact with
bogus applicants and by those familiar with the target group.

14. Para-legal support at all application points. This was a key component in this
project in terms of support for the target group. Para-legals should be well-trained for the
context in which they will be working, have easy access to independent legal back-up
when required, and be sensitive to the situation of the target population they are
supporting.

15. Sensitive questioning of illiterate and innumerate applicants. This is an issue
which needs to be considered for certain vulnerable target groups. There is also a need
for a standardised approach with regard to officially accepted names of applicants culturally specific linguistic knowledge is needed on which to base a strategy for spelling
the foreign names of illiterate applicants.
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12.0

Conclusions

12.1

The amnesty process and related outreach initiative was the first of its kind in South
Africa. The project provided a benchmark in forced migration policy implementation.
Though the Mozambican refugees were victimized by the lack of clear policies in South
Africa during its period of transition, this initiative embraced the issue of naturalisation
as an option for long-term refugees. The amnesty represented a tangible option for those
former refugees wishing to remain in the country to apply for formal resident status, and
for those who did not to register for assistance to return to Mozambique. This was
something that the UNHCR had not followed through on: to provide a durable solution
for those remaining refugees who did not take the voluntary repatriation option in 199495. Though very few registered for assistance to return to Mozambique during this
project, the option was crucial in terms of providing a real alternative for former
Mozambican refugees. It also served as a point of political legitimacy which encouraged
the support of the DHA in implementing the project.

12.2

The lessons from previous amnesty projects were fed into the planning and
implementation of the refugee amnesty. That these lessons would be taken seriously was
ensured by the participation on the planning committee and implementation of several
NGOs with detailed, expert knowledge. In that sense the amnesty became a far better
and more effective exercise than its SADC predecessor.
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12.3

Nevertheless, the DHA’s overriding concern with detecting unauthorized Mozambican
migrants impacted negatively on the amnesty implementation in at least two ways. First,
the amnesty was not, in fact, a national amnesty but confined to provinces in which the
DHA deemed former refugees lived. This was an erroneous assumption and excluded
any refugee who had moved to Gauteng for whatever reason during their first decade in
the country. In this sense, the amnesty as implemented by DHA failed to honour the
Cabinet’s decision. Second, the amnesty excluded contract workers who might originally
have come to South Africa as refugees and then, for reasons of survival, taken up work
on the farms or in the mines.

12.4

The DHA was also greatly concerned that it would be swamped by “bogus” applicants.
Regrettably, there were instances of bogus application, which played into these fears.
The DHA also refused any humanitarian extension to the amnesty on the grounds that
this would open the way for bogus applicants. This needs to be challenged and appealed
at a higher level, since it contravenes the original motivation to “regularise” the status of
the stipulated target group.

12.5

A huge amount of work remains in relation to the appeals from this project and the
inclusion of those genuine applicants who remain without status definition in the country.
Follow-up is also required in terms of ensuring the entrenchment of the rights that should
be accorded the successful applicants. An integration support programme has been set up
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by the concerned NGO partners to facilitate the formal process of integration into the
former refugee host communities. This project aims to focus on the host communities as
a whole rather than the target population in order to avoid creating any xenophobic
tensions.

12.6

Mozambican refugees are the only mass influx of refugees South Africa has sustained in
the last century. The experiences of the treatment of this group need to be built on for
any future refugee influx from neighbouring countries, or other groups from further
afield. Preparedness for potential refugees from the evolving situations in the SADC
region is a crucial. Lessons and recommendations from this document, together with the
wider experiences with the former Mozambican refugee example, can be drawn upon
both to develop appropriate responses now and to avoid learning the same lessons again.

Nicola Johnston
Wits Rural Facility
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APPENDIX

The following letter was drafted by RRP to summarise the issues requiring specific attention:
Political Channel for Appeals of Applications for Exemption from former Mozambican
Refugees - by Wits. RRP on behalf of the outreach support partners
Through the RRP monitoring of the processing and appeals phase of the regularisation
of former Mozambican refugees there appears to be some inconsistency in the scrutiny of
applications which are being rejected. This is particularly the case in Mpumalanga and
Kwazulu-Natal Provinces where the percentages of rejected applications are
considerably higher than in Northern Province. Mpumalanga’s rejection rate is 28.7%
(4th April), Kwazulu-Natal is 31.5% (4th April) and Northern Province is 2.8% (31st
March).
Some applications which appear to have been unfairly rejected have been appealed by
para-legals at a provincial level with additional support documentation from applicants
and written submissions and rejected by the Department of Home Affairs on review.
Some of these cases which are being rejected again on reconsideration seem to be
rejected on grounds which were outside the original accepted guidelines for qualifying
for exemption.
It has been agreed at a local and provincial level that there is a need to clarify and appeal
these issues at a higher level before taking appeals any further at a local level. Since the
DHA at provincial level are only able to work on directives from head office and head
office is implementing the parliamentary decision to offer Amnesty to those FMRs still
residing in South Africa, it was agreed that the issues of concern should be taken back to
the political level to clarify the motivation and interpretations of the original decision.
Points of Concern:
1. The process has been emphatically referred to by the DHA as a ‘Regularisation’
process rather than an ‘Amnesty’. (see early Task Force minutes). It therefore appears
inconsistent that genuine applicants are being refused exemption on issues of detail. For
example, in Mpumalanga appeals are being made correcting the grounds given for
rejection and on review other issues of detail are being found as grounds for sustaining
the rejection (refer to para-legal Jane Khumalo, Tonga office for specific examples) .
2. The Guidelines for the Exemption (Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999) referred to
the Cabinet decision as ‘unconditional’ (1.1), yet in some areas additional conditions are
being specified on the processing of applicants. For example, former Mozambican
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refugees in the border areas are being penalised for being in possession of Mozambican
identity documents which show that they have returned to Mozambique after their initial
entry date to South Africa.
3. Some applicants are being rejected for simple administrative mistakes in their
applications. For example, at the Tonga office in Mpumalanga applicants have been
rejected for not providing the photo-copy of both sides of their Mozambican Identity
document, or where an employer has not signed an affidavit, or where the school starting
date for dependent children is later than the date of entry.
4. Different spelling of names is a major concern (as it was in the SADC exemption).
Some applications are being rejected where the spelling of names is inconsistent. The
Mozambican/Portuguese spelling and names are similar sounding but often differently
spelled in South Africa. There is a need for a directive on this. Some offices in Northern
Province are correcting the spelling of names to the Mozambican spelling, whereas other
offices in Mpumalanga are rejecting applications because one or two letters are
differently spelled.
5. Survival fraud is an issue, as it was for those in exile during the apartheid regime.
Some former Mozambican refugees have used South African names to integrate and
acquire documents in South Africa. They now wish to regularise their status and are
using their own Mozambican names and are being rejected on the grounds that their
names are different.
6. Inconsistent dates in applications are a problem. It is difficult for illiterate applicants
(especially the elderly) to be accurate about dates. Often such applicants do not know
when they were born or when they entered the country. Some applicants are being
rejected on grounds of inconsistent dates. It is important that these applicants be assisted
on appeal, through other strategies of interrogation (eg. specialised interviews using PRA
strategies such as time-lines to identify dates - the war, floods, drought etc. which are
familiar to the applicant). These genuine applicants should not be penalised on the
grounds of their lack of numeracy.
7. Delays in the processing of applications due to the slow intervention support of the
Mozambican Consulate. There is a need to look at strategies to circumvent this delay and
to meet the original deadline for the processing of applicants with the extra support of the
DHA.
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